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Abstract
Background: In early 2015, highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N2 caused outbreaks in commercial poultry farms
in Minnesota and neighboring states where more than 48 million birds were affected. To date, the origin and
transmission pathways of HPAI H5N2 have not been conclusively established.
Methods: In this study, we analyzed forty-six samples from turkeys and their environment that were collected at
different time-points of the outbreak to identify origins and within outbreak evolutionary changes. We performed
de-novo whole genome sequencing from primary samples and the most recent common ancestors of the PB2, PA,
HA5, M and NS segments were traced back to Japanese HPAI H5N8 isolates. These segments appeared to have
diverged from the ancestor around June and November 2014.
Results: The time to most recent common ancestor analysis for PB1, NP and NA2 segments suggest two likely
possibilities of reassortant HPAI H5N2 origin - either a reassortment in Alaska area or multiple reassortments with
North American low pathogenic avian influenza strains, before the HPAI H5N2 outbreak strain emerged. Within the
outbreak, viruses clustered into two and three subgroups suggesting high substitution rates of 0.702x10-2 - 1.665x10-2
(subs/site/year), over the 5-month outbreak period.
Conclusions: Data are suggestive of a fast evolving HPAI strain within an outbreak that should be taken into
consideration in developing appropriate control strategies in the future.
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Background
Avian influenza virus (AIV) is an enveloped virus that
contains eight negative sense single strand RNA segments
which encode at least ten functional proteins [1].
Hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) are surface
proteins that are used to classify AIV into subtypes. At
present, 16 HA and 9 NA subtypes have been identified in
aquatic wild birds which are a natural reservoir of these
viruses [2]. AIV can be divided into low pathogenic avian
influenza viruses (LPAI) and highly pathogenic avian influ-
enza viruses (HPAI) by its ability to cause disease in
poultry which is identified by intravenous pathogenicity
index (IVPI) test or by it’s possession of poly-basic amino
acid feature at the HA cleavage site [3].
Outbreaks HPAI H5 in Guangdong, China in 1996
have likely origins from goose Guangdong lineage HPAI
viruses [4]. Since 1997, HPAI H5N1 dispersed in more
than 50 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle
East. In 2003, a re-emergence of HPAI H5N1 in China and
South East Asia was reported. Since its emergence, the H5
gene has continued to evolve and has been arbitrarily classi-
fied in the OIE nomenclature system into clades identified
from 0 to 9 [5]. The latest clade, 2.3.4.4, was designated in
January 2015 and replaced the provisional clade 2.3.4.6.
The first isolation of H5 clade 2.3.4.4 viruses was from
domestic mallard ducks (Anas platyrhynchos) in China in
2008 [6]. The H5 clade 2.3.4.4 has demonstrated an ability
to reassort with multiple neuraminidase subtypes including
N1, N2, N3, N5, N6 or N8 [7].
In January 2014, HPAI H5N8 caused outbreaks in 161
commercial poultry flocks in South Korea and led to
culling of 14,000,000 birds [8]. In early November 2014,
* Correspondence: sreev001@umn.edu
3Department of Veterinary Population Medicine, College of Veterinary
Medicine, University of Minnesota, 1971 Commonwealth Avenue, Rm 301E,
St. Paul, MN 55108, USA
4Department of Veterinary and Biomedical Sciences, College of Veterinary
Medicine, University of Minnesota, 1971 Commonwealth Avenue, Rm 301E,
St. Paul, MN 55108, USA
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2016 The Author(s). Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Nonthabenjawan et al. Virology Journal  (2016) 13:147 
DOI 10.1186/s12985-016-0605-4
HPAI H5N8 was detected in a turkey flock in Germany
followed by an outbreak in a duck farm in England and
a chicken farm in the Netherlands. Wild birds may play
an important role in generating novel reassortant subtypes
of clade 2.3.4.4 and carrying viruses across continents [9]. In
late November 2014, HPAI H5N2 caused outbreaks in
turkey and broiler breeder flock in British Columbia,
Canada. In the United States, the first case of HPAI H5 was
detected in a captive gyrfalcon (Falco rusticolus) in Wash-
ington in early December and subsequently the first detec-
tion of the reassortant HPAI H5N2 was reported in a
northern pintail duck (Anas acuta) in Washington. In
December 2014 and January 2015, HPAI H5 viruses associ-
ated with various NA subtypes were detected in backyard
poultry flocks in Oregon and Washington, USA [10]. In
January 2015, an HPAI H5N8 virus was detected in a com-
mercial turkey flock in California [11]. On March 2nd, 2015,
the first case of HPAI H5N2 in the Midwestern USA was
confirmed in Pope County, Minnesota. On June 17th, 2015,
last confirmed case in this outbreak was reported in Iowa.
In the Midwest region, more than 200 confirmed cases were
reported and more than 48,000,000 birds were affected [12].
In this study, we investigated the origin and within
outbreak evolution of this new emergent HPAI H5N2
that caused outbreaks in Midwestern states.
Methods
Sample collection
Samples were collected from turkeys and the environment
at locations involved in outbreaks of HP clade 2.3.4.4
H5N2. Sampling was performed over a 106-day period
during the outbreak. A total of 46 tissue or oropharyngeal
or environmental samples were collected. Samples were
divided into three phases representing an approximate
35-day interval each - early phase (March 4th–April
7th) [n = 18], mid phase (April 8th–May 12th) [n = 19]
and late phase (May 13th–June 17th) [n = 9].
All samples were identified by RT-PCR testing water
and bird samples from all barns of turkey flocks to identify
infected samples per established methods [13]. All RT-PCR
positive samples (water in infected barns, tracheal and
cloacal swabs from birds or air) collected at early, mid and
late phases of the outbreak were genome sequenced dir-
ectly from primary samples (Table 1).
Whole genome sequencing
Forty-six samples from turkeys, drinker biofilm, air and en-
vironment submitted to the University of Minnesota Mid
Central Research and Outreach Center (Willmar, MN)
were used in this study. RNA was extracted with the Mag-
MAX™-96 Viral RNA Isolation Kit (Ambion) using a mag-
netic particle processor (Kingfisher, model 700) according
to manufacturer’s instructions. All RNA samples were
tested by RT-PCR for matrix gene as described [13]. The
positive RNA samples were subjected to amplify all eight
segments of virus simultaneously using a one-step RT-PCR
as described [14]. Briefly, SuperScript® III one-Step RT-
PCR system with Platinum® Taq DNA polymerase (Invitro-
gen™; CA, USA) was used with 1.6 mM and 0.2 μM final
concentration of Magnesium and primers, respectively.
PCR products were imaged by electrophoresis in 1.5 %
agarose gel and subsequently purified by QIAquick PCR
Purification Kit (Qiagen®; Hilden, Germany). Purified PCR
products were submitted to University of Minnesota
Genomics Center (UMGC) for illumina paired-end
250 cycles sequencing by using Nextera XT DNA kit
for library generation. Sequences were assembled by
mapping all reads to a reference and whole- or partial-
genome sequences were extracted via CLC genomics work-
bench module available on Minnesota supercomputing in-
stitute (MSI) resources at the University of Minnesota.
Phylogenetic analysis
The reference nucleotide sequences were obtained from
Influenza Research Database (http://www.fludb.org/) and
GISAID (http://gisaid.org/) in May 2016. Reference se-
quences were selected to represent previous and recent
avian influenza strains from varying geographic areas
including North America and Eurasia. The following
approach was applied to select reference sequences: 1)
include an ancestral strain of clade 2.3.4; 2) use of se-
quences of isolates selected from 3 well characterized
H5 (2.3.4.4 lineage) outbreaks in Asia, Europe and North
America; and 3) use of a double selection criteria to
identify the top 30 hits to the current outbreak isolates
by BLAST and develop a tree. Subsequently, these closely
related sequences were reanalyzed by BLAST to expand
the reference database and used to reconstruct phylogeny.
LPAI North American strains that were isolated during
2012–2015 were also included. Reference and sample se-
quences from the current study were aligned using Muscle
v.3.6 [15] subsequently any extra sequences beyond and
after start and stop codon were trimmed. Maximum clade
credibility (MCC) tree of each gene segments were gener-
ated by BEAST 1.8 with Bayesian Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (BMCMC) algorithm. Strict clock model with co-
alescent constant population and HKY with gamma 4 sub-
stitution was used as model parameters [16, 17].
Mean substitution rate was estimated by Bayesian co-
alescent with constant population size [16] and strict clock
model was applied. The Bayesian MCMC chain lengths
were 10,000,000 generations with sampling every 10,000
generations and the effective sample size (ESS) value was
assessed by using Tracer (v1.6.0) (Molecular evolution,
phylogenetics and epidemiology, Edinburgh, Scotland,
UK) [18]. Every gene segment analysis had ESS value
greater than 200 to suggesting minimal standard error.
The resulting tree of each iteration was summarized for a
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Table 1 Details of samples in this study
Note: White and grey box indicates available and unavailable sequencing data on each segment, respectively. TS, CS and Envi stand for tracheal swab, cloacal
swab and environmental sample, respectively
Nonthabenjawan et al. Virology Journal  (2016) 13:147 Page 3 of 8
representative clustering pattern by using a tree annotator
with 10 % discarding of the chains as burn-in and the
resulting maximum clade credibility tree was visualized
with FigTree software (v1.4.2) (Molecular evolution, phy-
logenetics and epidemiology, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK).
Results
First case of this series of outbreaks in the Midwest area
was confirmed on March 4th, 2015 in Pope county,
Minnesota and last case on June 17th, 2015 in Iowa [12].
A 106-day period was divided into three phases repre-
senting an approximate 35-day interval - early phase
(March 4th–April 7th), mid phase (April 8th–May 12th)
and late phase (May 13th–June 17th). Eighteen, nineteen
and nine samples were collected during early, mid and
late phases of the outbreak, respectively (Table 1).
Origin of HPAI H5N2
Forty samples were successfully whole genome sequenced
and six provided whole segment sequences of some gene
segments as shown in Table 1. Phylogenetic analysis of
HPAI H5N2 (HPAI H5N2 EA/NA) showed that it was a
reassortant between Eurasian (EA) HPAI H5N8 and North
American (NAm) LPAI. HPAI H5N2 EA/NA genetic con-
stellation is composed of five gene segments (PB2, PA, HA,
M and NS) from EA HPAI H5N8 and the remaining three
segments (PB1, NP and NA) from NAm LPAI (Fig. 1a, b, c
and Additional file 1a–e).
Time to most recent common ancestor (TMRCA)
analysis showed that EA HPAI H5N8 likely evolved from
an AIV H5 clade 2.3.4.4 (China) between April 2008 and
January 2011 (2008.297–2010.255). Longer-term analysis
of HPAI H5N2 EA/NAm, TMRCA analysis indicated
that PB2, PA, HA5, M and NS segments diverged from
EA HPAI H5N8 (Japan) strain, around June and November
2014 (2014.438–2014.900). PB1 was closely related to non-
H5 LPAI North American strain isolated from Alaska (blue
branch) likely diverged from these isolates around June
2012 and June 2013 (2012.453–2013.438, mean TMRCA
2012.950). NP appears to have diverged from A/American
green-winged teal/Alaska/472/2014 (A/AGWT/AK/472/
14; pink branch) an LPAI H5N2 North American strain,
during September 2012 and December 2013 (2012.721–
2013.941, mean TMRCA 2013.358). NA2 ancestry traced
back to H5N2 that was isolated from Alaska during flu
season 2014–2015 (pink and green branches) and reas-
sortment likely occurred around December 2012 and
November 2013 (2012.993–2013.824, mean TMRCA
2013.400). TMRCA of all gene segments are summarized
in Fig. 2. The TMRCA format (E.g., 2006.272) was calcu-
lated using the formula: collection date divided by the
number days in a year. For example, January 10 2006 is
day 10th of the year; TMRCA= (1/365)*10 = 0.027 in the
year 2006 = 2006.027.
Within outbreak evolution
The mean substitution rate of all segments over the 106-
day interval of this study was estimated to be between
0.702 and 1.665 × 10−2. The NS gene segment was the
most divergent segment while NP gene segment was the
most conserved segment (Table 2). Bayesian Coalescent
analysis showed that every gene segment of samples in
this study formed three clades (I, II and III) except M
and NS segment that form two major clades (I and II)
(Fig. 1a–c and Additional file 1a–e). Members in subgroup
I of PB2, PB1, PA, HA5, NP and NA2 were consistent in
terms of clustering by time within the outbreak period with
some minor variations. For example two samples (E15 and
E16) fell into cluster II for M while the same samples clus-
tered in clade I for NS. The HA5 segment of Korean
H5N8 clustered within groups A and B [8]. Group A is a
predominant cluster and appears to have dispersed to
other continents. In addition, this cluster was subdivided
into 3 clades (A1, A2 and A3) [19]. HPAI EA/NAm H5N2
belongs to the A2 subgroup which same subgroup as the
two isolates H5N8 (Japan) and HPAI H5N2 (Canada) line-
ages (Fig. 1a). These results of high polymorphism rate and
diversification of gene segments over the course of the
epidemic indicate rapid evolution of viruses within this
outbreak. These analyses assume evolution from a single
introduction. Thus, that this high rate of change could
likely be explained by multiple introductions cannot be
ruled out.
Genetic analysis for amino acid variability
Genetic analysis of the HA5 segment indicated multiple
basic amino acid at HA cleavage site. Samples from
early and mid phase of the outbreak contain the motif
PLRERRRKR/GLF that is a characteristic of H5 clade
2.3.4, while samples collected during late phases of the
outbreak carried the PQRERRRKR/GLF motif Glutamine
(Q) is the major amino acid of other H5 clades [20].
Amino acid substitutions were analyzed by comparing
with A/Northern pintail/Washington/40964/2014 (A/NP/
WA/14), the first isolate of HPAI H5N2 EA/NA in the
US. At position 141 (H5 numbering system) on the HA
gene, A/NP/WA/14 and sub-cluster I contained serine (S)
while 17 samples, sub-cluster II and III, contain proline
(P). S141P mutations are related to surface protein stabil-
ity and reduced host immune response [21]. The deduced
amino acid sequence of the HA stalk region of all samples
were identical.
All samples contained S at position 31 on M2 that has
been shown to confer reduced susceptibility to amanta-
dine and rimantadine antiviral drugs. However, analysis
of resistance to neuraminidase inhibitors (NAI) at pos-
ition 119, 151, 222, 224, 276, 292 and 371 on NA2 gene
segment [22] showed that all samples in this study con-
tain the conserved amino acid at every position which
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Fig. 1 (See legend on next page.)
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are expected to maintain NAI susceptibility. The E627K
and D701N substitutions in the PB2 gene segment that
are expected to increase virulence in mammals were ex-
amined. The results showed that all samples contain E
and D in respective amino acid sites suggesting low
mammalian virulence in this group of viruses.
Discussion
A study addressing the spread of HPAI H5N8 from
South Korea to Europe and Japan have suggested that
these outbreaks originated from a single source popula-
tion [23]. Dispersion of the virus to different geographic
localities coincides with wild bird migratory seasons
strongly suggesting their important role in the transmission
of this pathogen and has been suggested as a mechanism
by which H5N8 entered South Korea [24]. The most likely
flyway involved in the recent spread of HPAI EA H5N8 to
Japan was the East Asian Australian (EAA) Flyway [23].
The EAA flyway extends from north-eastern Asia and
western Alaska to the southern extent of Australia and
New Zealand and Mongolia, western China and eastern
India [25]. On the North America continent, Alaska is
an area where there is major overlap between migratory
birds from the EAA and Pacific Flyways [25] but there
exists no evidence of HP H5 clade 2.3.4.4 in Alaska.
The existence of PB1, NP and NA2 ancestor that related to
HP H5N2 in Alaska arise the possibility that HPAI H5N2
EA/NA originated in a location that coincides with Alaska
and subsequently spread to British Columbia, Canada and
Washington, USA. However, the mechanism and timing of
viral transfer from the Pacific Flyway to the Mississippi
Flyway in NA has not been established.
The ancestral strain and the overlapping of interval
between TMRCA estimates of PB1, NP and NA2 suggest
two hypothesis of HPAI EA H5N2 origin. First, it is possible
that reassortant event occurred in Alaska. This finding is
concordant with the report of avian influenza surveillance
in Alaska during spring and summer 2015 that found
reassortant LPAI between EA and NAm [26]. Second,
the outbreak viral genome constellation likely occurred
via multiple reassortment events with an LPAI before
addition of genes of HPAI EA H5N2 origin due to the
earlier divergence time of PB1, NP and NA2. Further-
more, HA5 clade 2.3.4.4 has the potential to reassort
Fig. 2 Reconstruction of the genetic constellation of reassortment events leading up to the emergence of EA/NA H5N2. The eight genomic
segments are represented as parallel lines in descending order of segment 1 to 8. Each colored line represent transmission pathways of influenza
genes from different ancestor: Chinese H5 Clade 2.3.4.4 (purple), Eurasian HPAI H5N8 (green), Eurasian/North American HPAI H5N2 (red), LPAI H5
North American strain (pink) and non-H5 LPAI North American strain (blue). Black line represents the different NA subtype that was not included
in the analysis. Slopes lines represent divergent dates of each segment at 95 % highest posterior density interval
(See figure on previous page.)
Fig. 1 Time-scaled Bayesian maximum clade credibility tree inferred for the HA5 a, NA2 b and NS gene c. Trees were generated by Bayesian
Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm in Bayesian evolutionary analysis by sampling trees. The TMRCAs representing the estimated timing of viral
divergence from their ancestor are provided in parentheses. Red dot at each node represents the posterior probability above 0.7. A/AGWT/AK/
472/14, group of A/mallard/SAK/14 and non-H5 LPAI NAm strain were labeled by pink, green and blue branch. Clustering is shown with reference
strains of recent ancestry and within outbreak viruses clearly cluster in 2 or 3 clades separated by 35-day intervals. The TMRCA
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with multiple NA subtypes including NA1, NA2, NA5,
NA6 and NA8 [27]. For example, reassortant H5N1
(EA/NA H5N1) containing PB2, HA5, NP and M from
EA H5N8 and the rest of the gene segments (PB1, PA,
NA1 and NS) from AIV North American lineage was
detected in a green wing teal and an American wigeon
in December 2014, with no subsequent case reports.
This finding indicates that EA/NA H5N1 was likely un-
able to persist in the population while EA/NA H5N2
provided a compatible constellation for maintenance.
Alternately, this may indicate that there was insufficient
surveillance to detect the fate of that reassortment.
The nucleotide substitution rate of all segments within
the outbreak are greater than 5.000 × 10−3 substitution/
site/year which are higher than the rates estimated in
long term analysis [28]. These results indicated that
viruses were evolving rapidly during the current outbreak.
Host jump from wild birds to domestic poultry including
turkeys and chickens is a factor that provoked this rapid
evolution. Therefore, identification of bridge of interspecies
transmission is an important process to prevent the further
outbreaks. While the HA gene had an extremely high sub-
stitution rate, the HA stalk region of all samples were iden-
tical at the amino acid level. The HA stalk region, PA and
NP proteins were highly conserved, opening avenues for a
universal subunit vaccine concept and development.
At present, no human case has been reported due to
HPAI H5N2 EA/NA and it is considered as low health
risk to public health [29]. However, three human cases
with severe respiratory disease caused by HPAI H5N6
HA5 clade 2.3.4.4 have been reported in China [30].
These cases confirmed that HA5 clade 2.3.4.4 is capable
of causing human infection and thus ongoing monitoring
of viral evolution should be performed.
Conclusion
Wild bird surveillance in United States has been per-
formed annually during September and November,
which is a migratory season and only fecal or cloacal
swabs are traditionally collected. After HPAI H5 clade
2.3.4.4 was detected in December 2014, USDA/APHIS
wildlife services responded by enhancing surveillance in
Pacific Flyway and detected more viruses. Furthermore,
multiple introductions of this clade of viruses cannot be
ruled out. Therefore, there is a need for more compre-
hensive wild bird surveillance effort to address a com-
plex wild-domestic animal-human interface to capture
variations in subtype specific organ predilection and vary-
ing patterns of shedding by different host species.
Additional file
Additional file 1: Alignment and phylogeny of PB2 segment sequences
also captures the 3 stages in evolution amon the outbreak isolates.
(ZIP 2258 kb)
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